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Analysis of the Remote Manipulator System
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a top-o_n analysis of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Orbiter Remote Manipulator
System (RMS).
The RMS hardware and software are primarily required for
deploying and/or retrieving up to five payloads during a single
mission, capture and retrieve free-flying payloads, and for
performing Manipulator Foot Restraint operations. Specifically,
the RMS hardware consists of the following components:
o End Effector
o Displays and Controls
o Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
o ARM Based Electronics
o ARM
The IOA analysis process utilized available RMS hardware
drawings, schematics and documents for defining hardware
assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of
hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes
and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of
the effect for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the five major divisions of the RMS. A summary of the number
of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with
Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality
second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality: I 1/l I 2/IRI 2/2 1 3/IR 1 3/2R 1 3/3 I TOTALNumber : 240 112 25 24 12 161 574
1
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
+- +






































The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utiliz-
ing available drawings, schematics and documents to breakdown the
respective subsystem into components and low-level hardware
items. Each hardware item is evaluated for failure mode,
effects, and criticality. These data are documented in the
respective subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the
NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA
analysis approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0
through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and
Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is to be performed and
documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
4
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Step 4.0 Compare I0A analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The RMS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were
defined to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the
ground rules and assumptions contained in NST____SS2220_____66.
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3.0 SYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The RMS is a major component of the Payload Deployment and
Recovery System (PDRS) of the Space Shuttle Orbiter. It is used
primarily for the deployment of payloads in orbit or the
retrieval of payloads from orbit for return to earth or
redeployment in orbit. The RMS is also used in conjunction with
the Manipulator Foot Restraint (MFR) for various Extra Vehicular
Activity (EVA) tasks.
The RMS is an Anthropomorphic Man-machine System that consists of
six servocontrolled rotary joints and an end effector all
connected together by structural boom members. The RMS is
attached to the orbiter longeron (port, starboard, or both)
through a roll-out mechanism. The arm is operated by a crew
member using direct viewing and closed circuit television (CCTV),
from the Display and Control (D&C) station located on the aft
flight deck.
The primary components of the RMS are:
o Backup Drive Amplifier (BDA)
o Display and Control Panel (D&C)
o End Effector (EE)
o End Effector Electronics Unit (EEU)
o Joint Power Conditioner (JPC)
o Manipulator Controller Interface Unit (MCIU)
o Motor Module/Slgnal Conditioning Unit (MM/SCU)
o Rotational Hand Controller (RHC)
o Servo Power Amplifier (SPA)
o Translation Hand Controller (THC)
o Thermal Protection Kit (TPK)
3.1.1 Backup Drive Amplifier - There is only one BDA for
each RMS and it is located in the shoulder Joint's
electronics housing. The BDA is a backup unit to any of
the SPAs, in the event of a SPA failure or its
associated power source (JPC). The main functions of
the BDA are to provide drive to any one Joint motor as
selected from the D&C panel and to provide for power
conditioning from the backup +28 V bus.
3.1.2 Display and Control - The D&C panel provides
primary/backup control on display functions, and
contains D&C electronics and Orbiter/THC/RHC wiring
interfaces. All of the displays and the majority of the
controls are used to control and monitor the RMS in its
prime modes of operation. Three control functions,
located on a separate section of the D&C panel, form the








End Effector - The standard EE is designed to effect
the capture or release of a previously captured payload
by means of capture/release and rigidize/derigidize
operations. The capture/release sequences are achieved
by rotating internal rings located at the open end of
the EE body to open or close three wire snares around
the payload grapple fixture. The rigidize/derigidize
sequences withdraw the snare assembly towards the rear
of the EE body thereby tensioning the snare wires and
pulling the snared payload into full and keyed
orientation and contact with the end effector, or
extend the snare assembly to release tension on the
payload. The EE consists essentially of the EE body,
prime channel drive chain, EEEU, EE wiring harness,
Backup release system, and seven microswitches for
status of the EE.
End Effector Electronics Unit - The EEEU is located
within the EE body and controls and monitors the
operation of the EE as commanded by the operator from
the D&C panel. This includes power conditioning,
command decoding, detects failures in decoding and
commutator logic, outputs signal flags, and conditions
the EE status signals which are sent to the MCIU via the
data bus.
Joint Power Conditioner - There are two JPCs per
manipulator arm. One of which is located in the shoulder
Joint electronics compartment serving the shoulder and
elbow Joints, and the second is located in the wrist
electronics compartment serving the three wrist Joints.
The JPCs convert the +28 v dc bus to provide secondary
regulated supply voltages of +15 v and +i0.i v dc to the
SPA's motor commutators and position encoders.
Overvoltage and undervoltage protection circuits are
provided to shut off the JPC if preset threshold values
are exceeded or not achieved.
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit - The MCIU handles
the exchange of information between the Orbiter GPC and
the RMS and other entities of the system. The MCIU
performs manipulation of data but does not have any
significant data processing function. In addition to
GPC/MCIU communication the MCIU has data communication
with the Arm Based Electronics (ABE) and the D&C, does
data gathering from the THC, RHC, and temperature
sensors, does hard wired fault detection and
annunciation, performs auto saflng, brake drive control,
auto braking, EE drive commands in EE auto mode, and
power conditioning for MCIU and D&C.
Motor Module/Signal Conditioning Unit - The Motor Module





drive for Joint movement in response to commands from
the MCIU via the SPA, and in response to the feedback
signal from the tachometer. This tachometer feedback
signal is low level and is amplified by the SCU for use
by the MM.
Rotational Hand Controller - The RHC is a three axis
manual controller which provides electrical control
signals for the RMS point of resolution (POR) in the
pitch, yaw, and roll degrees of freedom. These control
signals are proportional to the manual input
displacement of the RHC handgrip in each of the three
mutually perpendicular axis. The RHC handgrip also has
three secondary switch inputs for rate hold,
vernier/coarse, and capture/release. The gimbal
assembly is the main mechanism that obtains the manual
commands input into the handgrip. Transducers provide
the appropriate signals to the MCIU.
Servo Power Amplifier - Each RMS has six SPAs, one for
each Joint. Each SPA provides a drive signal to it's
Joint motor in response to MCIU control signals or
direct drive commands from the D&C panel. The SPA also
provides an excitation signal to the tachometer,
transmits data back to the MCIU, releases the joint
brake in response to a MCIU command, performs self-
testing, switches the motor drive from MDA to BDA on
command, and transmits external flags to the MCIU.
Translation Hand Controller - The THC allows the
operator to control the three-dlmensional linear motion
of the end effector by means of manual inputs through
the controller handgrip. The POR velocity commands are
proportional to the deflection of the handle. Three
independent electrical signals are provided, by the THCs
gimbal assembly transducers, to the MCIU, one for each
control axis. This gimbal mechanism, located within the
THC assembly, is the main mechanism for obtaining the X,
Y, and Z axis commands.
Thermal Protection Kit - The RMS uses active and passive
thermal control systems both to keep the RMS within
proper operating temperatures and to isolate the mani-
pulator arm from the space environment. This TPK
essentially consists of thermal blankets, white paint,
heaters and thermostats, and thermistors. The thermal
blankets primarily provide the space environment
isolation function. The white paint minimizes external
heat input while maximizing heat radiation due to
internal dissipation of electronics. The heaters and
thermostats control the temperature within limits while
the thermistors provide the temperature monitoring
function.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The components of the RMS are located on the aft flight deck of
the crew compartment and within the payload bay of the Orbiter.
The items in the crew compartment are the RHC, THC, D&C Panel,
MCIU and the GPC. The manipulator arm, SPAs, JPCs, BDA, MM/SCU,
EE, and EEEU are located in the payload bay along the port
longeron (or starboard longeron or both).
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 2 through 7 illustrate the hierarchy of the RMS










































Figure 4 - DISPLAY & CONTROLS PANEL SUBCOMPONENTS
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Figure 7 - ARM SUBC0MPONENTS
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the five major subdivisions
of the RMS. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions
and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent
paragraphs. The RMS analysis hierarchy is illustrated in
Figure i.










































Of these 574 failure modes analyzed, 413 were determined to be
PCIs. A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix
D contains a cross reference between each PCI and analysis work-
sheet in Appendix C.
TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
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4.1 Analysis Results - End Effector
The End Effector analysis considered five subcomponents as shown
in Figure 3. Most criticalities were I/i and 2/IR. There are
seventy-two PCIs.
4.2 Analysis Results - Displays and Controls
The Displays and Controls were divided into three subcomponents
as shown in Figure 4. There are one hundred forty-nine PCIs.
4.3 Analysis Results - Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
The Manipulator Controller Interface Unit was divided into six
subcomponents as shown on Figure 5. Most criticalities were
found to be 2/IR. There are ninety-one PCIs.
4.4 Analysis Results - ARM Based Electronics
The Arm Based Electronics were divided into twelve subcomponents
as shown on Figure 6. Most criticalities were i/i due to
uncommanded motion. There are ninety-four PCIs.
4.5 Analysis Results - ARM
The ARM was divided into thgee subcomponents as shown on Figure
7. 0nly seven significant criticalities were found.
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- Arm Based Electronics
- Alternating Current
- Abort Once Around
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Assembly
- Abort to Orbit
- Backup Flight System
- Backup Drive Amplifier




- Cathode Ray Tube
- Caution and Warning System
- direct current
- Distribution
- Data Processing System
- Display Unit
- Display & Control
- End Effector
- End Effector Electronics Unit





- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- General Purpose Computer
- Gallons Per Minute




- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Joint Power Conditioner
- Johnson Space Center
- Load Control Assembly
- Liquid Hydrogen
- Liquid Oxygen
- Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine Controller
- Main

































- Main Propulsion System
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
- Push Button Indicator
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Payload Deployment and Recovery System
- Point of Resolution
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Rotation Hand Controller
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Manipulator System
- Remote Power Controller
- Return to Launch Site
- Systems Management
- Servopower Amplifier
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Main Engine
- Space Transportation System
- Software
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Translation Hand Controller
- Thermal Protection Kit
- Thrust Vector Control
- Water Spray Boiler
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Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the f--_lowing
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
T;_ - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
A0A - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
t-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION = termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-l-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE iMM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve---_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH, PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS _ or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en-_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear




DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employe--d-with the






The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error







All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of I0A analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis•
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 RMS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly
level• The analysis considered the worst case effects of the
hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
i B ARMS mission is considered to be uncradling,
grappling a berthed payload, unberthing it, deploying
it and then retrieving a rotating payload, berthing it
and performing MFR operations. Any failure that
prevents the completion of any of these tasks is loss
of mission (i.e. loss of manual augmented modes).
RATIONALE: This is the most demanding nominal RMS
mission possible. This causes the worst
case criticalities for certain failures
because they will prevent the completion of
this mission. If the mission was simpler,
many failures would be a lower criticality.
• Consistency checking and safing is not considered
redundancy for failures that cause uncommanded motion.
RATIONALE: The consistency check and safing are not
redundant for the hardware that when fails
causes uncommanded motion. They are also
only designed to stop the RMS in 2 feet,
which may not prevent collision.
, A Criticality 1 failure is considered to be any failure
that causes uncommanded motion, uncommanded release,
uncommanded derigidization, or loss of capability to
move a joint or any number of joints. It also includes
the loss of the ability to release a payload, and the
payload hanging up in the snares.
RATIONALE: Uncommanded motion in its worst case can
cause the loss of vehicle if the arm or
payload struck a window or damaged the
payload bay doors so they could not close.
Uncommanded release could cause the payload
to hit the Orbiter, uncommanded
derigidization or a payload hanging up in
the snares can cause the unrestrained
payload on the end effector to swing into
the Orbiter. The loss of the ability to
move a joint or release a payload would
mean the RMS could not be cradled which





The loss of primary modes will cause loss of mission
(Criticality 2) but backup is considered redundancy for
release of the payload and cradling the RMS for some
failures• Therefore, loss of primary modes is a
criticality 2 as long as backup is available.
RATIONALE: Without primary modes the RMS mission
cannot be accomplished• Backup mode does
not provide enough redundancy to accomplish
the task mentioned in rule I. Backup does
provide some redundancy for failures that
cause loss of payload release or loss of
joint drive. Therefore, the failures that
backup provides redundancy for will be
classified as loss of mission•
For ascent, entry and aborts, the RMS is assumed to be
cradled, latched, and unpowered. Only failures that
can occur while the RMS is in this mode are considered
for those flight phases.
RATIONALE: The RMS is designed for use while onorbit.
During ascent and entry the RMS is latched
and unpowered. No consideration will be
given to failures unless they have an
effect during ascent and entry.
Failure modes are assumed to occur during two arm
operations• If a failure can effect two arms, then the
worst case result of that effect will determine the
criticality.
RATIONALE: The Orbiter is capable of supporting dual
arm operation. If this configuration
proves to be the worst case for a
particular failure, then that will drive
the criticality•
Failures of wire harnesses and bundles (structural
failures, wire to wire shorts, incorrect attachment)
are not considered. Failures of a single wire are
covered by considering loss of input or output from a
component•
RATIONALE: The failure of wire harnesses and bundles
are not being considered because of the





This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at'the
b-o-ttom of Each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(llke or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P _ Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
C-I
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ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.ENT.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONCE MODE SWITCH IS MOVED SOFTWARE REMAINS IN IDLE MODE.
COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODE WHICH IS LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR
OPEN













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.ENT. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT ENTER COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES WHICH IS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL CAUSE ARM TO LIMP WHEN END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH MOVED FROM
OFF. EE WILL CAPTURE AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN
AUTO. UNCOMMANDED LIMPING CAN CAUSE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE CAN CAUSE SNARE HANGUP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 1
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
CANNOT CAPTURE IN AUTO EE MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDENT CAPABILITY TO
CAPTURE. MANUAL MODE IS REDUNANT CAPABILITY TO CAPTURE. ARM
WILL NOT LIMP DURING MANUAL CAPTURE RE DAMAGE MAY RESULT IN CRIT
z/z.
REFERENCES:
































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EE WILL RBLEASEWHEN EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL.
UNCOMMANDEDRELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT RELEASE PAYLOAD IN MANUAL MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO
RELEASE PAYLOAD. EE AUTO MODE AND BACKUP MODE ARE REDUNDANT TO
MANUAL FOR RELEASING PAYLOADS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:













FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EE WILL CLOSE WHEN MANUAL OPEN IS COMMANDED. LOSS OF REDUNANT
PATH TO RELEASE PAYLOAD. EE AUTO MODE AND B/U MODE ARE REDUNDANT
TO MANUAL FOR RELEASING PAYLOAD.
REFERENCES:













CAUTION AND WARNING TONE
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION" DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SW.2






BISTABLE FAILURE ALSO FAILS MASTER ALARM
REFERENCES:














CAUTION AND WARNING TONE
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SW.2
CAUSES: BISTABLE OUTPUT FAILS LOW. TRANSISTOR DRIVER FAILS OPEN
CIRCUIT. LOSS OF 12V POWER SUPPLY.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AUDIO ALARM WILL NOT COME ON.
ALARM LIGHT OFF.
BISTABLE FAILURE ALSO FAILS MASTER
REFERENCES:








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.3
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS ON.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED LIGHT REMAINS ON WHEN PANEL IS POWERED.
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [SA ]








CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS OFF.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAIL LIGHT WILL NOT COME ON.
BULBS BURN OUT {2).
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD. BRK. 5
CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS HIGH.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WRONG INDICATION OF BRAKE STATUS. NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO "OFF"
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] . C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.5
CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS LOW.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WRONG INDICATION OF BRAKE STATUS. NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: SOFTWARE STOP TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA" ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SS.I




















LEAD ANALYST-" B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]























CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01127187 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL







CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS OFF.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIGHT WILL NOT COME ON.
REFERENCES:










FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.7














FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.6








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT





REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01/27/87" C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]




























LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCKES/DISPLAYS














REDUNDANCY SEREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL











REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 4
C [NA ]




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL





















FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A _NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 3




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]














REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.2




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY



























B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 1




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-32
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN ENTER PBI IS PUSHED, MODE WILL BE ENTERED ACCORDING TO
HIEARCHY ASSUMING MODE ENTRY CONDITIONS ARE MET. COULD LOSE EE
MODE WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR ROTATING TRACK AND CAPTURE OF DEFINED
MISSION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT ENTER FAILED MODE(S). DIRECT MODE LIGHT WILL NOT WORK.
COULD USE EE MODE WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR ROTATING TRACK AND
CAPTURE OF DEFINED MISSION.
REFERENCES:
























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
DERIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 6
CAUSES" PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EE WILL DERIGIDIZEWHEN EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL MODE.
UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
DERIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B C F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DERIGIDIZE EE IN MANUAL MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO
DERIGIDIZATION. EE AUTO MODE IS REDUNDANT PATH TO MANUAL MODE.
LOSS OF DERIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:



























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
DERIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] BCF] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EE WILL RIGIDIZE WHEN MANUAL DERIGIDIZATION IS COMMANDED. LOSS
OF REDUNDANT PATH TO RIGIDIZATION. EE AUTO MODE IS REDUNDANT
PATH TO MANUAL MODE. LOSS DERIGIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
DERIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF" / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. DERIGIDIZATION CHECK IS INHIBITED.
RIGIDIZE COMMAND WILLOVERRIDE.
REFERENCES :

























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
DERIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LKNDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
RIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUND.ANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B C F ] C C F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EE WILL RIGIDIZE AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO OPERATE EE. EE AUTO MOSE IS REDUNDANT
PATH TO MANUAL MODE. LOSS OF EE IS LOSS OF MISSION SINCE PAYLOAD
CANNOT BE CAPTURED.
REFERENCES:




























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
RIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT RIGIDIZE IN MANUAL EE MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO
RIGIDIZATION. EE AUTO MODE IS REDUNDANT PATH TO MANUAL MODE.
LOSS OF RIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:




























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
RIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [HA ] C [HA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. EE WILL RIGIDIZE FROM 28V AS WELL AS 12 V.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-42
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: OPEN DIODE











END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
RIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
END EFFECTOR WILL DERIGIDIZE WHEN RIGIDIZATION IS COMMANDED.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL
RIGID POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION" DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 1
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
WILL CAUSE ARM TO LIMP IF END EFFECTOR MODE NOT IN OFF.
UNCOMMANDED LIMPING CAN CAUSE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES :







































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING MANUAL RIGIDIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MCIU COMMANDED SAFINGALWAYS PRESENT. DIRECT AND BACKUP MODES
ONLY AVAILABLE. DEFINE MISSION CANNOT BE DONE WITH DIRECT AND
BACKUP MODES ONLY.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT COMMAND MCIU COMMANDED SAFING. LOSS OF REDUNDANTABILITY
TO STOP ARM WITH SAFING SWITCH IS UNCOMMANDED MOTION. HARDWIRE
SAFING STILL WORKS. MCIU COMMANDED ANDHARDWIRED SAFINGARE
REDUNDANT PATHS OF OPERATOR COMMANDED SAFING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/05/8 5 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD, SF.4
cCF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HARDWIRED SAFING FROM SWITCH. LOSS OF REDUNDANT ABILITY TO
STOP ARM WITH SAFING SWITCH IS UNCOMMANDED MOTION. MCIU
COMMANDED SAFING STILL WORKS. MCIU COMMANDED AND HARDWIRED
SAFING ARE REDUNDANT PATHS OF OPERATOR COMMANDED SAFING.
REFERENCES:





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWIRE SAFING OCCURS WHEN SAFING SWITCH IN AUTO POSITION.
DIRECT AN BACKUP MODES ONLY AVAILABLE. DEFINED MISSION CANNOT BE
DONE WITH DIRECT AND BACKUP MODES ONLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S IRA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. ARM WILL HARDWIRE SAFE WHEN SAFING
SWITCH IS TAKEN TO CANCEL (TB WILL GO/REMAIN BP). MCIU SAFING
WILL STILL BE CANCELLED AND HARDWIRED SAFING WILL BE REMOVED WHEN
SWITCH IS RETURNED TO AUTO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD,SF.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MCIU COMMANDED SAFING IS CANCELLED WITHSAFING SWITCH IN AUTO
POSITION. NO EFFECT ON OTHER OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES :





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MCIUCOMMANDED SAFINGCANNOT BE CANCELLED. MCIUCOMMAND SAFING
OCCURS EACH TIME MCIU IS TURNED ON. DIRECT ANDBACKUP MODES
REMAIN. CANNOT COMPLETE DEFINED MISSION WITH DIRECT AND BACKUP
ONLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD. 2
CCF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN DIRECT MODE ANYTIME BRAKES ARE ON WITH PRIMARY POWER AND ARM
SELECTED. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH IN ABILITY TO INHIBIT
UNCOMMANDED JOINT DRIVE. LIGHT WILL ONLY INDICATE DIRECT MODE
WHEN 10V CONTACT IS MADE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT COMMAND IN DIRECT MODE. MODE LIGHT WILL STILL COME ON.
DIRECT MODE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR DEFINED MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:


















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.3
C[F]
CAUSES" PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH IN ABILITY TO
INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED DERIGID. FAILURE OF MANUAL CONTROL SWITCH
BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZATION.
REFERENCES:





























END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES












A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIDIZE IN MANUAL EE MODE.
RIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:



















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
AUTO POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH INABILITY TO
INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZATION. FAILURE OF MCIUEE AUTO
LOGIC BECOMES CRIT 1 FORUNCOMMANDED DERIGIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

























END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
AUTO POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] CCF]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIDIZE IN AUTO EE MODE.
RIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
AUTO POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH IN ABILITY TO
INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE OR RELEASE. FAILURE OF MCIUEE AUTO
LOGIC BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR UNCOMMANDEDRELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
AUTO POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] D[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT _ OR RELEASE rS AUTO _ MODZ.
CRIT I_
LOSS OF RELEASE IS
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
AUTO POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH INABILITY TO
INHIBIT LIMPING. FAILURE OF CAPTURE TRIGGER BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR
UNCOMMANDEDLIMPINGWHICHISUNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
AUTO POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EE AUTO MODE.
RELEASE.
LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH OF PAYLOAD
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:


















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM. 2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH IN ABLILITY TO
INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE/RELEASE. FAILURE OF CAPTURE/RELEASE
TRIGGER BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR UNCOMMANDEDRELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-64
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] CCF]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT CAPTURE OR RELEASE IN MANUAL EE MODE.
CRIT I.
LOSS OF RELEASE IS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:



















END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER- DC.SD.EEM. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. FAILURE OFT HE CAPTURE TRIGGER OR MANUAL


























END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH
MANUAL POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING NORMAL MANUALEE OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC, SD, BRK, 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SOFTWARE ALWAYS SEES BRAKE COMMAND. BRAKES STILL WORKS.
CONSISTENCY CHECK PARAMETERS WILL NOT RESET WHICH MAY CAUSE FALSE
CONSISTENCY CHECK ALARMWHEN BRAKES ARE REMOVED. FALSE
CONSISTENCY CHECKS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ] C [ Y ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SOFTWARE NEVER SEES BRAKE COMMAND. BRAKES STILL WORK.
CONSISTENCY CHECK PARAMETERS WILL NOT RESET WHICH MAY CAUSE FALSE
CONSISTENCY CHECK ALARMWHEN BRAKES ARE REMOVED. FALSE
CONSISTENCY CHECKS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIRECT LIGHT WILL NOT ILLUMINATE WHEN DIRECT MODE IS SELECTED AND
BRAKES ARE ON. DIRECT DRIVE STILL WORKS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL











REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [SA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AUTO MODES CANNOT BE ENTERED.
STOP.
IF SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS IT WILL
REFERENCES :


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT STOP ARM WITH AUTO SEQUENCE SWITCH WHICH IS UNCOMMANDED
MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS. 1
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AUTO MODES CANNOT BE ENTERED. IF IN AUTO MODE WILL PROCEED
WITHOUT SWITCH THROW AND WILL NOT STOP AT PAUSE POINTS WHICH IS
UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES :










































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT PROCEED AUTO MODES.
REFERENCES:














MASTER ALARM PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATIONz DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MA.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WOULD NOT RECEIVE MASTER ALARM TONE ORLIGHT.
REFERENCES :









ITEM: MASTER ALARM PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] .








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT CANCEL MASTER ALARM AND TONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.6
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STARBOARD ARM WILL MOVEWHENPORTARM IS COMMANDED IN BACKUP.
PORT EE WILL OPENWHEN B/U PAYLOAD RELEASE IS COMMANDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT OPERATE STARBOARD ARM IN BACKUP POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT
METHOD TO DRIVE JOINT AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. PRIMARY DRIVE
FAILURES AND EE FAILURES BECOME CRIT I.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT




























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PORT ARM WILL MOVE WHEN STARBOARDARM IS COMMANDED IN BACKUP.
PORT EE WILL OPEN WHEN B/U PAYLOAD RELEASE IS COMMANDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT OPERATE PORT ARM IN BACKUP POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT
METHOD TO DRIVE JOINT ANDRELEASE PAYLOAD. PRIMARY DRIVE





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STARBOARD ARM REMAINS POWERED REGARDLESS OF SWITCH POSITION.
STARBOARD ARM COULD MOVE WHEN PORT IS COMMANDED. STARBOARD EE
WILL ALSO RECEIVE PORT EE COMMANDS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT OPERATE STARBOARD ARM IN PRIMARY POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT
METHOD TO DRIVE JOINT AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. DEFINED MISSION
CANNOT BE COMPLETED IN BACKUP.
REFERENCES:


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PORT ARM REMAINS POWERED REGARDLESS OF SWITCH POSITION. PORT ARM
COULD MOVE WHEN STARBOARD IS COMMANDED. PORT EE WILL ALSO
RECEIVE STARBOARD EE COMMANDS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-84
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT OPERATE PORT ARM IN PRIMARY POWER.
METHOD TO DIRVE JOINT AND RELEASE PAYLOAD.




































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS= A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EE WILL CAPTURE AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL.
UNCOMMANDED MOTION CAN CAUSE SNARE HANGUP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT CAPTURE IN MANUAL EE MODE.
CAPTURE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO
REFBRENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2
C [NA ]



































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [-NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT CAPTURE IN MANUAL EE MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO
CAPTURE. END EFFECTOR WILLRELEASE WHEN CAPTURE IS COMMANDED FOR
MANUAL EE MODE.
REFERENCES:





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SNARE WILL OPEN AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN AUTO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B C F ] CCF]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT RELEASE EE IN AUTO EE MODE.
TO RELEASE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.5




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" 8/1 I/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.5
C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DRIVE JOINT(S) IN BACKUP. LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO
DRIVE JOINT. PRIMARY MODE FAILURES BECOME CRIT i.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) RMS POWER SWITCH
BACKUP POSITION
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BACKUP EDGE LIGHTING REMAINS ON.
REFERENCES:







































A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BACKUP EDGE LIGHTING WILL NOT WORK.
REFERENCES:

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] . B IRA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PANEL LIGHTING IS ALWAYS POWERED.
REFERENCES:


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF_ / TAL: /
ONORBI T: 2/ 2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE WHICH IS LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[r] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/ii/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBS YS TEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 198 ABORT:
ITEM: ENABLE CONTACT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN








1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH
NEGATIVE POSITIVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTI_OL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
CANNOT REMOVE POWER FROM MCIU OR DC POWER TO PANEL.
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE:
CANNOT OPERATE RMS IN PRIMARY POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT ABILITY
TO DRIVE JOINTS. BACKUP FAILURES BECOME CRIT 1.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENTUNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-102
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-103
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























BACKUP PAYLOAD RELEASE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SNARES COMMANDED OPEN WHEN BACKUP POWER SELECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-104
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BPR. 1
C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT OPEN SNARES IN BACKUP.
RELEASE PAYLOAD.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-105
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:














I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH
NEGATIVE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL" /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
CANNOT DRIVE POSITIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP MODE.
REFERENCES :
Q
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 206 ABORT:
ITEM: COMMAND CONTACT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-107
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: I TAL: I
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
CANNOT DRIVE NEGATIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-10S
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



















i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH
POSITIVE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-109
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









































LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BJS. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONLY JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL DRIVE IN BACKUP. LOSE
REDUNDANT PATH TO DRIVE JOINT. PRIMARY DRIVE FAILURE BECOMES
CRIT i.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-110
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

























BACKUP JOINT SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BJS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL NOT DRIVE. LOSE REDUNDANT
PATH TO DRIVE JOINT. PRIMARY DRIVE FAILURES BECOME CRIT 1.
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS_ A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.DD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ELEMENT(S) ALWAYS REMAINS ON WHEN PANEL POWERED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.DD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEMENT(S) DOES NOT DISPLAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-i13
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: 28V ENABLE CONTACT
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED








i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH
NEGATIVE POSITION
CRITICA/_TIES
rLZGHT PS_S_ _W/nn;C ABORT SDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-114
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: 28V ENABLE CONTACT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONOREIT: 3/ IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN NEGATIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-116
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: 28V ENABLE CONTACT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2
C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENTUNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 0112_18_ C-118
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: OPEN DIODE








i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH
POSITIVE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / HTLS:. /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2
C [NA ]




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: SHORTED DIODE








i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH
POSITIVE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JOINT WILL DRIVE IN NEGATIVE DIRECTION WHEN POSITIVE SELECTED,
RESULTING IN UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAONCH: / HTLS: /
LIFTOFF: I TAL: I
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/1 i/86 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





















FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN NEGATIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



















1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH
NEGATIVE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JOINT WILL DRIVE IN POSITIVE DIRECTION WHEN NEGATIVE SELECTED,
RESULTING IN UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT" I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]- C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER_ DC.SD.SD.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
SELECTED JOINT WILL DRIVE WITHOUT DEFLECTING SWITCH WHEN IN
SINGLE MODE. CANNOT ENTER SINGLE MODE IF NOT IN IT WHEN FAILURE
OCCURS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORB IT: 3/ 1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT COMMAND ANY JOINT INNEGATIVE DIRECTION WHILE IN SINGLE
MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-126
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SELECTED JOINT WILL DRIVE WITHOUT DEFLECTING SWITCH WHEN IN
SINGLE MODE. CANNOT ENTER SINGLE MODE IF NOT IN IT WHEN FAILURE
OCCURS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:














I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH
POSITIVE POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.I
C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT COMMAND ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION WHILE IN SINGLE
MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-12S
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.I
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN SINGLE MODE JOINT WILL DRIVE (AND DATA DISPLAYED ACCORDING TO
HIEARCHY). COULD RESULT IN WRONG JOINT BEING DRIVEN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] BEF] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DRIVE (OR DISPLAY DATA FOR) FAILED JOINT CONTACT.











































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.2
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL DRIVE WHEN ANY JOINT IS
COMMANDED IN DIRECT MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL" /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] CEF]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL NOT DRIVE IN DIRECT MODE.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.
REFERENCES,
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LAMP ON CONTINOUSLY IF ACTIVATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DO A LAMP TEST.
REFERENCES:




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PS.I
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED ACCORDING TO HIEARCHY OF CONTACT MADE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-135
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PS.I
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT DISPLAY DATA RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-136
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINES
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
L_FTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [4_A ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS, UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR
UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILL RECEIVE WORDS FROM D
& C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN
THE PROPER SLOTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINES
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBZT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD. 1
CAUSESz PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS, UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR
UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILL RECEIVE WORDS FROM D
& C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN
THE PROPER SLOTS.
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-138
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS, UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR
UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SELECTED D & C RECEIVE WORD WILL BE
ORED WITH WORD OF FAILED ADDRESS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 239 ABORT:





LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD OR DRIVE JOINT.
FAILED WORD WILL NOT BE RECEIVED FROM PANEL.
REFERENCES:














D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES
LOSS OF WORD 0
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD.2
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EE MODE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: D & C INVERTOR NETWORK
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









•_ PHASE _w/_mc _aORT _w/nmc
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT z / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR UNCOMMANDED
PAYLOAD RELEASE. BIT RELATED TO FAILED INVERTOR IS OPPOSITE OF
NORMAL STATUS FOR ALL WORDS FROM PANEL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






D & C INVERTORNETWORK
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD OR DRIVE JOINT.
LOSS OF EE MODE POSSIBLE. BIT RELATED TO FAILED INVERTOR WILL
ALWAYS BE A 0 STATE FOR ALL WORDS FROM PANEL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 243 ABORT:
ITEM: D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER- DC.DB.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL DATA FROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FALSE STATE.








REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 244 ABORT:
ITEM: D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C C F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL DATAFROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FALSE STATE.








REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRZLAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC DATAFROM PANEL. UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ASSUMES SIGNAL TO
INVERTER STILL GOOD. INPUT WORD TO D & C GETS ORED WITH OUTPUT
WORD FROM PANEL RESULTING IN ERRATIC DATA TO SOFTWARE.
REFERENCES:














D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
OPEN














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
D & C DATA ALARM. ASSUMES SIGNAL TO INVERTER STILL GOOD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORXSHEET
DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] "B[P] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO DATA IS TRANSFERED TO OR FROM D & C PANEL. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
TO DRIVE JOINT, SAFE ARM AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. D & C TEST WORD
CHECK WILL ANNUNCIATE IMMEDIATELY IN TEMP MONITOR MODE OR HIGHER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO DATA IS TRANSFERED TO OR FROM D & C PANEL. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
TO DRIVE JOINT, SAFE ARM AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. LOSS OF EE MODE
POSSIBLE. D & C TEST WORD CHECK WILL ANNUNCIATE IMMEDIATELY IN
TEMP MONITOR MODE OR HIGHER.
REFERENCES:














SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G, RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TALl /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBITi / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS. UNCOMMANDED MOTION
OR UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILLRECEIVE WORDS FROM
D & C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN
PROPER SLOTS.
REFERENCES :














SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS. UNCOMMANDED MOTION
OR UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILLRECEIVE WORDS FROM
D & C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN
PROPER SLOTS.
REFERENCES:














SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IS ALWAYS DISPLAYED AT TRUE STATE.
& C DATA ALARM.
D
REFERENCES:














SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IS ALWAYS DISPLAYED AT FALSE STATE.
& C DATA ALARM.
D
REFERENCES:













LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.6
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. D & C DATA ALARM. SOFTWARE WILL
CONTINUE TO USE DATA EVEN THOUGH IT FAILS PARITY CHECK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-154
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.6
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. D & C DATA ALARM. SOFTWARE WILL
CONTINUE TO USE DATA EVEN THOUGH IT FAILS PARITY CHECK.
REFERENCES:











LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRBLAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. D & C DATA ALARM. SOFTWARE WILL
CONTINUE TO USE DATA EVEN THOUGH IT FAILS PARITY CHECK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.7
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL BE SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS TRUE
STATE. D & C DATA ALARM. UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR UNCOMMANDED
PAYLOAD RELEASE. WILL FAIL TEST WORD CHECK BUT SOFTWARE WILL
CONTINUE TO USE DATA FROM PANEL.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.?
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL BE SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FALSE
STATE. D & C DATA ALARM. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO DRIVE JOINT,
SAFE ARM OR RELEASE PAYLOAD. LOSS OF EE MODE POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES :









ITEM: PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.7
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL DATA FROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS TRUE STATE.
UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE IF IN EE AUTO FOR POSSIBLE SNARE HANGUP. D &
C ALARM. WILL FAIL TEST WORD CHECK BUT SOFTWARE WILL CONTINUE TO
USE DATA FROM PANEL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ALL DATA FROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FASLE STATE. LOSS
OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD AND DRIVE JOINT. LOSS
OF EE MODE. D & C DATA ALARM. WILL FAIL TEST WORD CHECK BUT
SOFTWARE WILL CONTINUE TO USE DATA FROM PANEL.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-le0
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL DISPLAY TRUE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-161
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL DISPLAY FALSE.
REFERENCES:









ITEM: INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC DATA DISPLAYED. DISPLAYS RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS WILL
BE DRIVEN BY ALL DATA WORDS TO PANEL.
REFERENCES :














INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCORRECT DATA DISPLAYED.
WILL DISPLAY FALSE STATE.
DISPLAYS RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS
REFERENCES:














OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB. 9
C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IN TWO WORDS (0-1,2-3,ETC.) ALWAYS IS
SEEN BY SOFTWARE AS FALSE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM,
RELEASE PAYLOAD, OR DRIVE JOINT. LOSS OF EE MODE.
REFERENCES:









ITEM: OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAIILVRE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IN ALL OUTPUT WORDS ALWAYS SEEN AS
TRUE. UNCOMMANDED MOTION ORUNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
SHORTED
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE OR MOTION.
WORD RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS GET ORED WITH OTHER WORDS FROM
PANEL.
REFERENCES :









ITEM: OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9
CCF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD, OR DIRVE JOINT.
WORD FROM D & C PANEL RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS IS SEEN BY
SOFTWARE AS ALL 0 - FALSE STATE.
REFERENCES:














OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT
LOSS OF WORD 0













SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EE MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CV.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT SELECT COARSE RATE MODE. IN A TIME CRITICAL TIMELINE THE
SLOWER RATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CV. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT SELECT VERNIER RATE MODE. SLOWER RATE CANNOT BE USED.
REFERENCES:





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] C[F]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RH.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SHORT WOULD CONTINOUSLY ENABLE RATE HOLD.
UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
THIS COULD LEAD TO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:







PHYSICAL BINDING, LINKAGE DISCONNECTS
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: _ [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LINKAGE BREAKS/SLIPS FOR
X-AXIS (FORWARD/BACK9 OR Z-AXIS (UP/DOWN) MOTION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER LOSES THE ABILITY TO TRANSMIT
FORWARD/BACK OR UP/DOWN MOTION.
REFERENCES :










FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPERATE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RM.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UPON FAILURE COMMANDED RATES CANNOT BE OBSERVED ON THE METER.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-174
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPERATE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RM.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UPON FAILURE ACTUALRATES CANNOT BE OBSERVED ON THE METER.
REFERENCES:































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL" /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT" / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RM.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UPON FAILURE OF THE TALKBACKTHE COARSE/VERNIER INDICATION CANNOT
BE OBSERVED ON THE CONSOLE.
REFERENCES:



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MCIU WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE COMMAND.
SHOULDER BRACE WILL STILL RELEASE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C CNA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MCIU WILL NEVERRECEIVE SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE COMMAND.
BRACE WILL STILL RELEASE.
SHOULDER
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_JNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHOULDER BRACE WILL RELEASE AS SOON AS THE PRIMARY POWER IS
APPLIED TO THE ARM. SHOULDER BRACE SOLINOID COULD OVERHEAT AND
OPEN THE CIRCUIT BREAKER DUE TO CONTINOUS POWER ON IT. LOSS
PANEL LIGHTING IS ALSO POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORB IT: 2/ 2 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE.
REDUNDANCY FOR RELEASE OF SHOULDER BRACE.
EVA IS THE ONLY
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHOULDER BRACE WILL RELEASE AS SOON AS THE PRIMARY IS APPLIED TO
THE ARM. SHOULDER BRACE SOLINOID COULD OVERHEAT AND OPEN THE
CIRCUIT BREAKER DUE TO CONTINOUS POWER ON IT. LOSS OF PANEL
LIGHTING IS ALSO POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-183
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE.
REDUNDANCY FOR RELEASE OF SHOULDER BRACE.
EVA IS ONLY
REFERENCES:










FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPERATE















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRBLAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TALKBACK FAILURE WILL NOT ALLOW SHOULDER BRACE STATUS TO BE
OBSERVED.
REFERENCES:











LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION" DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO INITIATE AUTO SAFING.
RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIDIZE.
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
REFERENCES:











LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






















A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.I



















OPEN, DIRECT DRIVE CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP DRIVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO" /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL CAPTURE CAPABILITY. LOSE AUTO AND MANUAL RELEASE
CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.2
C [NA ]




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-190
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO INITIATE AUTO SAFING.
RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIZE.
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.3




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













OPEN, DIRECT DRIVE CIRCUIT





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[r]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL. 4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP DRIVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL CAPTURE CAPABILITY. LOSE AUTO AND MANUALRELEASE
CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-194
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]























LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO INITIATE AUTO SAFING.
REFERENCES :
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PERMANENT SAFING WILL OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S IF]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
BACKUP DRIVE CAPABILITY.
RETAIN DIRECT DRIVE AND
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.2
CCF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY.
BACKUP REMAIN.
COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES AND
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-199
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










PHYSICAL BINDING, LINKAGE DISCONNECTS















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER LOSES THE ABILITY TO TRANSMIT PITCH
SIGNALS.
REFERENCES :


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01127187 C-203
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-204
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]












REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.5
C [NA ]




REPOR_ DATE 01/27/87 C-206
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-208
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
































REDUNDANCY SCREENS= A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:







































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [S_ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

















1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-220
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [N_ ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-223 "
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.3
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.4
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:



















1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) END EFFECTOR MODE
OFF POSITION
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.4
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-226
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-228
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-229
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

















i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) END EFFECTOR MODE
OFF POSITION
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-230
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT










































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEC.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-231
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

















1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS
3) END EFFECTOR MANUAL MODE
OFF POSITION
CRITICALITIES






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-232
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [SA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.4
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:






































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] .B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-236
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.5
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT











































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.5
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :




































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-240
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 340 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSDUCER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]
LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT






REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-241
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 341 ABORT:
ITEM: TRANSDUCER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 3
CCF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT

























i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) HAND CONTROLLERS
3) ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
ELECTRICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ F]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT
SIGNAL. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT
SIGNAL. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT








i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) HAND CONTROLLERS
3) ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
ELECTRICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
DC CONTROL OUTPUT SIGNALS. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
DC CONTROL OUTPUT SIGNALS. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-246
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC. 4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
DC CONTROL OUTPUT SIGNALS. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES:"
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-247 "
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[F] C[F]
LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
DC CONTROL SIGNALS OUTPUT. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES :









ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL= /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : AC2 ] BCF] C[F]
LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
DC CONTROL SIGNALS OUTPUT. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED








1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) HAND CONTROLLERS
3) TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
ELECTRICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
DC CONTROL SIGNALS OUTPUT. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-250
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.XX. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF OSCILLATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ SIGNAL TO
BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF DC CONTROL
SIGNALS FROM BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THEREFORE LOSS OF BOTH HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.XX. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF OSCILLATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ SIGNAL TO
BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF DC CONTROL
SIGNALS FROM BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THEREFORE LOSS OF BOTH HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES :
















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.XX.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF OSCILLATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 EHZ SIGNAL TO
BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF DC CONTROL
SIGNALS FROM BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THEREFORE LOSS OF BOTH HAND
CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.
LIGHTING WILL STAY BRIGHT OR OUT.
REFERENCES:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING" /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] s [SA ] C [NA ] .
LOCATION: DISPLAYAND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAY PANEL IS WASHED OUT DUE TO BRIGHT LIGHTING.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-256
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.3
C [NA ]
CAUSESz PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAY PANEL IS DARK DUE TO THE INABILITY TO DIM LIGHTING.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOVEMENT OF SWITCH FROM VARIABLE SELECTION DOES NOT GIVE BRIGHT
SELECTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD, LTG.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
MOVEMENT OF SWITCH TO VARIABLE SELECTION DOES NOT GIVE VARIABLE
CONTROL.
REFERENCES :
































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.
LIGHTING WILL STAY BRIGHT OR OUT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-260
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B rNA ]
Q








CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-261
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 361 ABORT: /
ITEM: RETURN SPRING
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE) SPRING ROTATIONAL
HAND CONTROLLER DOES NOT RETURN TO CENTER







1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
2) HAND CONTROLLERS
3) ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SPRING BREAKS/LOSS OF
ELASTICITY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER LOSES THE ABILITY TO RETURN BACK TO
CENTER, MUST BE MOVED BACK TO CENTER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN B HEATERS
OFF. A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR. 3
ccF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN B HEATERS ON.
A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES :





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LI FTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN A HEATERS
OFF. A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN A HEATERS ON.
A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-266
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, OPEN















FLIGHT PHASE" HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION TO OFF CONTACTS.
REFERENCES:







































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA 3 B [NA ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL
PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.4
C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION TO OFF CONTACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-268
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC
PRBLAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER MUST ME MOVED BACK TO CENTER.
REFERENCES:









ITEM: ENCODER PHOTO DETECTORS
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CN/A] C [N/A]
LOCATION" MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 1
CAUSES: CIRCUITRY FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO
S/W. ONE (OR MORE) OF THE 15 PHOTO SENSORS COULD FAIL, RESULTING
IN ERRATIC OUTPUT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: ENCODER PHOTO DETECTORS
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [N/A] C [N/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 2
CAUSES: LOSS OF +5.1V INPUT, CIRCUITRY FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO S/W
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: ENCODER ROTATING DISK
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT z i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CN/A] C CN/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.EN.4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION OF DISK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO S/W
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B (N/A 3 C IN/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.MTR. 1
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT TO STATORWINDINGS OR VOLTAGE TOO LOW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT MAY BE BACKDRIVEN
REFERENCES :










FAILURE MODE: MOTOR FAILS DUE TO SEIZED BEARINGS
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] s IN/A] C IN/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.MTR. 2
CAUSES: HIGH FRICTION DUE TO CONTAMINATION, GALLING, LACK OF
LUBRICATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT IS FROZEN (i.e., MECHANICAL JAM),
JOINT CANNOT BE BACKDRIVEN.
REFERENCES:













MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN MOTOR SHAFT OR QUILL
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




























JOINT MAY BE BACKDRIVEN. BRAKE IS STILL
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT










MOTOR SHAFT AND PININON GEAR
MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN DRIVE SHAFT OR PINION
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.MTR. 4
B IN/A] C [N/A]
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. BRAKE WILLNOT HOLD JOINTTHEREBY MAKING
BACKDRIVE TECHNIQUES QUESTIONABLE. THE ONLY THING HOLDING THE
JOINT IS THE FRICTION IN THE GEAR TRAIN.
REFERENCES:









ITEM: COMMUTATOR ROTATING DISK
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN/A] C [N/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.COM. 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION OF DISK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION AS MOTOR IS NOT ABLE TO RUN PROPERLY. NO B/U
COMMUTATOR DISK. LOSS OF JOINT DRIVE BOTH IN PRIMARY AND B/U
MODES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER ELECTRONICSELECT
NO OUTPUT. ALL THREE CHANNELS FAIL OFF
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.2
B CN/A] C CN/A]





MOTOR IS UNABLE TO RUN OR PROVIDE
"REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-2_8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER ELECTRONICSELECT
LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.2
CAUSES: OP AMP FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOTOR WILL OPERATE IN A DEGRADED FASHION DUE TO A REDUCTION IN
MOTOR TORQUE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-279
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: . A [NA ] B CN/A] C ON/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.3
CAUSES: LOSS OF +5.1V INPUT RAIL.
SHORTED LEAD.
BURNED OUT LED. OPEN LEAD.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION. MOTOR IS UNABLE OT RUN OR PROVIDE TORQUE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-280
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: COMMUTATOR PHOTO SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION" MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.4
CAUSES: CIRCUITRY FAILURE, OPEN OR SHORTED PHOTO SENSOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOTOR WILL OPERATE IN A DEGRADED FASHION DUE TO A REDUCTION IN
MOTOR TORQUE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: COMMUTATOR PHOTO SENSOR
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF 2 OR MORE CHANNELS
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. MOTOR IS UNABLE TO RUN OR PROVIDE
SUFFICIENT TORQUE FOR OPERATION.
REFERENCES :













LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [N/A] C [N/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.5




MOTOR IS UNABLETO RUN OR PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-283
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT













LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBZT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





MOTOR WILL OPERATE IN A DEGRADED FASHION DUE TO REDUCED TORQUE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-284
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: SHAFT FRACTURES
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF" / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN/A] C IN/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.GB. 1
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UNCOMMAND PDR MOTION. JOINT IS ESSENTIALLY FAILED UNRESTRAINED
(i.e.,) THERE IS SOME FRICTION IN G2 GEAR TRAIN). WON'T ATTEMPT
BACKDRIVE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S IN/A] C [N/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.GB. 1
CAUSES: BEARING SEIZURE, GEAR FRACTURES, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT IS FAILED FROZEN.
TECHNIQUES WILL NOT WORK.
BACKDRIVE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-286
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: SHAFT FRACTURES
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF" / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /







JOINT IS FAILED UNRESTRAINED. WONIT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.GB. 2
B IN/A] C IN/A]
CAUSES: BEARING SEIZURE, GEAR FRACTURES, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT IS FAILED FROZEN.
TECHNIQUES WILL NOT WORK.
BACKDRIVE
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-288
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












NO OUTOUT OR ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CN/A] C IN/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.TCH. 1
CAUSES: SHORTED ROTOR OR OPEN ROTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUNAWAY. WORST CASE FAILURE. RUNAWAY COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO
ORBITER OR INJURY TO CREW. NOTE: DIRECT DRIVE AND B/U MODE ARE
STILL AVAILABLE TO DRIVE THEARM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANAL¥ST_ R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT z / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] s IN/A] C IN/A]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.TCH. 2
CAUSES: OPEN CIRCUIT OF COIL, LOSS OF EXCITATION TO COIL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RUNAWAY. WORST CASE FAILURE. RUNAWAY COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO
ORBITER OR INJURY TO CREW. NOTE: DIRECT DRIVE AND B/U MODE ARE
STILL AVAILABLE TO DRIVE THEARM.
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-290
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL" /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA" /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 8
CAUSES: BITE CIRCUIT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BITE LOGIC INCORRECTLY ANNUNCIATES COMMUTATOR FAILURE.
BITE LOGIC. BITE DOESN'T INHIBIT JOINT DRIVE.
NO B/U
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.8
CAUSES: FAILED BITE CIRCUIT OUTPUT. FAILED 25 KHZ CLOCK SIGNAL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
BITE LOGIC WILL NOT ANNUNCIATE COMMUTATOR FAILURE. NO B/U BITE
LOGIC.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 14
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE POR RESETS (ZEROIS) THE DATA LATCHES, SHIFT REGISTERS, ETC.
(ESSENTIALLY SAFING ON ONE JOINT). THIS COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
MOTION OF THE POINT OF RESOLUTION.
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 14
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LATCHES, SHIFT REGISTERS, ETC., WOULD NOT BE RESET WHEN THE
ARM IS SELECTED. THEREFORE, OLD DATA WOULD STILL BE PRESENT;
HOWEVER SINCE MCIU-ABE COMMUNICATIONS OCCURS ONCE EVERY 42 MSEC.,
THE "OLD" DATA WOULD BE PRESENT FOR ONLY 42 MSEC.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 ° C-294
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: CONTROLLER, POWER CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: , /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURES OF THE CONTROLLER WILL HAVE THE SAME RESULT AS CONVERTER
FAILURES. FOR EXAMPLE, FAILURE OF THE 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE
GENERATOR CIRCUIT WOULD INHIBIT THE PWM OUTPUT OF THE CONTROLLER
WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR CONVERTER OUTPUT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-295
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: CONTROLLER, POWER CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFFZ / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF THE CURRENT BALANCE COMPARATOR STAGE OR
VOLTAGE FEEDBACK COMPARATOR STAGE COULD RESULT IN ERRATIC OUTPUT
OF THE CONVERTER OR AN OVERVOLTAGE/UNDERVOLTAGE/OVERCURRENT
CONDITION.
REFERENCES :









ITEM: CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD= G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF +IOV OR +5.1V WILL "SHUTDOWN" THE ENCODER AND THE
COMMUNTATOR. LIKEWISE, THE LOSS OF +I0V OR +-ISV WILL SHUTDOWN
THE MDA. THESE FAILURES WILL AFFECT THREE JOINTS CAUSING
UNCOMMANDED POR MOTION DUE TO 3 JOINTS STOPPING.
REFERENCES :









ITEM: CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT EDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A FULL WAVE RECTIFIER TO A HALF WAVE RECTIFIER COULD
CAUSE ERRATIC OUTPUT FROM THE ENCODER, COMMUTATOR, MDA, AND ABE
DATA BUS. WORST CASE-UNCOMMANDED POR MOTION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-298
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OVERVOLTAGE/UNDERVOLTAGE OR OVERCURRENT CONDITION WILL BE
SENSED IN THE PROTECTOR MODULE AND SHUT DOWN THE JPC. THIS
ACTION COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED POR MOTION.
REFERENCES_
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM" 28V BITE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE BITE DOESNIT "DRIVE" ANYTHING WHICH COULD STOP THE ARM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: 28V BITE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF" / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BITE DOESN'T PROVIDE ANY SAFETY FEATURES, THEREFORE ONLY THE
ANNUNCIATION (OF A SPA +28V SOURCE BELOW TOLERANCE LEVEL) WILL BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-301
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE • HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFIHG: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TACH BITE IS WHAT "DRIVES" AUTO BRAKES. THEREFORE, THE TACH
BITE FAILING "ON" WOULD CAUSE THE BRAKES TO BE APPLIED TO ALL SIX
JOINTS. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :











LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA" /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
BASED ON OUR GROUND RULES, FAILURE OF ANY BITE "OFF" IS 3/3.
THAT IS, AN ACTUAL TACH FAILURE IS ALREADY A i/i.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE WITHIN ANY ONE OF THE THREE PROTECTION CIRCUITS WILL
CAUSE THE JPC TO SHUTDOWN. THIS COULD RESULT IN UNCOMMANDED
MOTION OF THE POR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-304
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE PROTECTION CIRCUIT TO DETECT A PROBLEM IS IN
ITSELF A 3/3. AN ACTUAL FAILURE OF THE JPC, IN CONJUCTION WITH
THIS FAILURE, IS REALLY NO WORSE THAN JUST THE ACTUAL JPC
FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-305
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFIHG: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE JPC BITE FLAG DOES NOT "DRIVE" ANYTHING WHICH COULD STOP THE
ARM.
REFERENCES :
REPORT °DATE 01/27/87 C-306
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE JPC BITE FLAG DOES NOT "DRIVE" ANYTHING WHICH COULD STOP THE
ARM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.SCU.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDBACK TO THE PLL COULD CAUSE A RUNAWAY/UNCOMMANDED
MOTION OF THE POR.
REFERENCES:










FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.SCU.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BIASED FEEDBACK TO PLL COULD CAUSE A RUNAWAY/UNCOMMANDED MOTION
OF THE POR IN THE BIASED LOW CASE AND SLUGGISHNESS OF JOINT
MOTION (AND POR) IN THE BIASED HIGH CASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO GPC
SOFTWARE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING
ERRATIC OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO GPC
SOFTWARE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/S7 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCE: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO GPC
SOFTWARE.
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-312
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: O. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] C[F]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-314
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL" /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] DCF] C/F]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SETS POWER FAIL BIT. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.






REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BC ] cCF]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SETS POWER FAIL BIT. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.






REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-316
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JOINT WILL MOVE AT AN ERRATIC SPEED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-317
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION- ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-318
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:





FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBS¥S LEAD" G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE. TE. 4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-320
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-321
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 6
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-322
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: O/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-323
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












O/P _CK OR SYNCH SIGNAL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBXT; / ATO; /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS; A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-324
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: 3.2 MHZ OSC
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS" A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.10
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-325
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION" ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. i0
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO" /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] . C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. ii
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. ii
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO- /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C _NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.12
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:








LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 12
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-330
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: ANALOG F/B (COMMUTATOR)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.13
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: ANALOG F/B (COMMUTATOR)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.13
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUPREMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-332
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH, / RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION" ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 4
B [NA ] C CNA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-333
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 465 ABORT:
ITEM: + 28V
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.13
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT ALLOW BRAKES TO BE RELEASED. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-334
_NDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.16
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF= / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.15
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DRIVE JOINT.
MODES.
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-338
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 15
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANT "BRAKES OFF" SIGNAL TO SCU.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127/87 C-339 "
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
MODE.
BACKUP IS ONLY REMAINING
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 2
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BACKUP MODE. ALL OTHERS REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S IRA] C [NA ]
LOCATION= ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.II
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-343
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A (NA ] B [NA ] C (NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-344
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 3




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-345
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.3
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DIRECT MODE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MDA BITE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE ERRONEOUS CONSISTANCY CHECK MESSAGES.
REFERENCES:









ITEM: MDA BITE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] .
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILS TO ANNUNCIATE OVERCURRENT CONDITION IN CURRENT LIMIT
CIRCUIT. POSSIBLE UNEXPECTED JOINT SPEED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-348
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-349
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 1
s rNA ] c [NX ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-350
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: POWER "ON" RESET
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. i0
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 " C-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












PO_ nON tt RESET
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C (NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. I0
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-352
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.12
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.12
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-354
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MTR TRANSFER RELAY
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF DIRECT MODE. ARM
WILL HAVE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ARM WILL MOVE AS SOON AS JOINT IS
SELECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE. BDA. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL MODES.
REFERENCES:











LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.2





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-357
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] c [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: PWM SWITCH ELECTRONICS
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD" G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [s_ ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[S%] c [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER" ABE.BDA. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES :











LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 4
B [NA ] O [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] c [_A ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-362
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE. BDA. 5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] D CRA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHERMODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-364
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-365
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE UNCOMMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-366
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: POWER SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-368
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:






























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT PUT BRAKES ON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-369
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BRK.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT TAKE BRAKES OFF.
DIRECT DRIVE REMAINS.
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
.REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-37_
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.BRK.2
B [NA ] C [NA ]




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-371
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 503 ABORT:
ITEM: MECHANICAL
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYSLEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:




















































LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 14
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSISTANCY CHECK IS DISABLED. WILL HAVE NO EFFECT AS LONG AS
EVERYTHING ELSE WORKS CORRECTLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a IRA ]
LOCATION: ARM







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSISTANC¥ CHECK IS ENABLED.
IF JOINT IS BACKDRIVEN.
WILL GET FALSE CONSISTANCY CHECKS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127/87 C-374
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: 16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MULTIPLEXOR WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS.
RHC AND THC CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
ERRONEOUS TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES:














16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3)
OPEN























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F) C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MULTIPLEXOR WILL NOT OUTPUT RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC
AND THC CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE
DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES :



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COUNTER WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS DATA. LOSS OF RHC AND THC
CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS
TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-377
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW'/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COUNTER WILL NOT OUTPUT DATA. LOSS OF RHC AND THC CAPABILITIES.
ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES:









ITEM: SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OPAMP
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[_] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AMP WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS.
THC CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.
LOSS OF RHC AND
ERRONEOUS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-379
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP
OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] DCF] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AMP WILL NOT OUTPUT RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC AND THC
CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-380
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMPARATOR OUTPUTS ERRONEOUS CURRENT. LOSS OF RHC AND THC
CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS
TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES=
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-381
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:


















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMPARATORWILLNOT OUTPUT ANY CURRENT. LOSS OF RHC AND THC
CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES:














ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF_ / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AD CONVERTER WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF
RHC AND THC CAPABILITIES OR UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS
TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-383
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /






CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AD CONVERTER WILL NOT OUTPUT RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC
AND THC CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE
DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-384
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)
SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /
LIFTOFFz / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENSz A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCH WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC
AND THC CAPABILITIES OR UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS
TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-385
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)
OPEN











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LATCH WILLNOT OUTPUT RHCAND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC AND THC
CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.
REFERENCES:



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2] B/F] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 614 ABORT:
ITEM: MULTIWINDING OUTPUT TRANSFORMER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN



























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAYING.





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-388
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO" /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFINGANDPOSSIBLEUNCOMMANDED
MOTION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-389
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i0/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 616 ABORT:
ITEM: 2-PHASE PWM
FAILURE MODE: OPEN



























A[2 ] B[F] C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-391
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: POWER SWITCHING TRANSISTORS
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PO.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.
LOSS OF EE CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-392
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR
SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING" /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-393
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 620 ABORT:
ITEM: 30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F]
LOCATION: MCIU







CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-394
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWM ADJUSTER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT" / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-395
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 622 ABORT:
ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWMADJUSTER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-396
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE WIDTH ADJUSTER
SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-397
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE WIDTH ADJUSTER
OPEN























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.
LOSS OF AUTO EE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-398
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[_]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-399
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 626 ABORT:
ITEM: RECTIFIER MODULES
FAILURE MODE: OPEN


























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-400
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MC_U























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-402
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFABLLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCl-_



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[.F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-403
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MC_
























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-404
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU






























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-405
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 632 ABORT:
ITEM: 16 MHZ CRYSTALOSCILLATOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYSLEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1) MCIU
























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-406
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER (3)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /




PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 4
A[2] B[F] C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA INTO THE
MIA. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED
MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-407
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER (3)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) Hera









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] n[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA INTO THE
MIA. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-40S
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: I/1
MDAC ID: 635 ABORT: /
ITEM: I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA OUT OF THE
MIA. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED
MOTION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /





A[2 ] B[F] C [F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA OUT OF THE MIA.
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-410
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCZU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /




PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 6
A[2] B[F] C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS TDA SIGNAL WILL REACH THE MIAWHICH PREVENTS DATA FROM
BEING SENT TO THE GPC. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-411
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: TRANSMIT TIMING CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /




PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 6
A[2 ] B(F] C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TDA SIGNAL WILLNOT REACH THE MIAWHICHPREVENTS DATA FROM BEING
SENT TOT HE GPC. LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.
REFERENCES:
















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PREVENTS GPC/MCIU COMMUNICATION. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED
MODES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES :
















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCI"U



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.7




LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTER AUGMENTED
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-414
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU








SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL SAFING CAPABILITY. LOSS OF AUTO BRAKING. LOSS OF
CAPTURE/RELEASE CAPABILITY. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. LOSS
OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP CAPABILITY
REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 642 ABORT:
ITEM: BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CEF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER" MCU.FD. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:







REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-416
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 643 ABORT: /
ITEM: BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
/
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MCXU
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F)
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BRAKES. LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE.
CAPABILITY.
LOSS OF AUTO BRAKING
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-417
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 644 ABORT:





LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MC_U









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /





A [ 2 ] B CF] C [ F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT RELEASE BRAKES. LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.
ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING CAPTURE/RIGIDIZATION PROCESS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-418
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i0/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: AUTO BRAKE CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU








FLIGHT "PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /






CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AUTO BRAKING FAILED ON. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-419
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: AUTO BRAKE CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN

































CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO AUTO BRAKING CAPABILITY. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-420 °
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCZ'U



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-421
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 648 ABORT:
ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MCIU























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-422
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT













LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C [F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ERRONEOUS DATA IS OUTPUT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF COMPUTER AUGMENTED
MODES THROUGH PERMANENT AUTO SAFING OR AUTO BRAKING. LOSS OF
AUTO EE CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE OR
DERIGIDIZATION.
REFERENCES :















LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCZ_









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /






CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO SAYING, AUTO BRAKING, AND AUTO EE CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-424
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT












4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /






CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ERRONEOUS DATA OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF AUTO SAFING.
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-425
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:






4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCrU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /




PART NUMBER: MCU.FD. 6
A[2] B[F] C[F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
REFERENCES:














FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR TIMING CIRCUIT
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) XCr_









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [ F] C [F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR TIMING CIRCUIT
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MC_U




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO SAYING CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-428
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: 7-BIT BINARY COUNTER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU





























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-429
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: 7-BIT BINARY COUNTER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCrU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD. 8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-430
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 657 ABORT: /
ITEM: READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-431
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/8G HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-432 "
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: I/1
MDAC ID: 659 ABORT: /
ITEM: LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P
FAILURE NODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z) MCZ'U









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /





A[ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS DATA TO THE ABE AND DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-433
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]. _CF] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
















UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT EDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS DATA TO THE ABE AND DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-435
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 662 ABORT:
ITEM: UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-436
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: ABE OUTPUT DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MCIU








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /




PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 3
A[ 2 ] B IF] C IF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS DATA TO THE ARM. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-437
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 664 ABORT:
ITEM: ABE OUTPUT DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MClU






















CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-438
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-439
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 666 ABORT: /
ITEM: LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SOME DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL INDICATORS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-440
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATEI 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDACID: 667 ABORT: , /
ITEM: UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MCIU




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION_ MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 5
S [_X ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-441
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU





























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SOME DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL INDICATORS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-442
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












D & C STROBE
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE AND DERIGIDIZATION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-443
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 670 ABORT:
ITEM: D & C STROBE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU



























PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 6
AC2] BCF] CCF]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITZES.





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 ° C-444
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












D & C CLOCK
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE AND DERIGIDIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-445
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









D & C CLOCK
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCZU




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A ( 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITIES.





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-446
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-447
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU
























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITIES.





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-448
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) ABE I/P
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.
REFERENCES :














SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) ABE I/P
OPEN
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLILEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCrU




















B[r] C[F]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LOSS OF AUTO EE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:














SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) D & C I/P
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCrU




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.10
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITIES.
LOSS OF AUTO EE
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 0112_IS_ C-451
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) D & C I/P
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MCIU









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.10
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.
CAPABILITIES.
LOSS OF AUTO EE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-452
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MC_O


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.II
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANT CHECK CRTAND MASTER ALARM ON DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.
NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-453
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT














LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD, G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY"
1) MCIU




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS, A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.II
CAUSES, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO DISPLAY AND CONTROL PARITY ERROR ANNUNCIATION.
REFERENCES,























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-455
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBERz MCU.MC.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-456
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-457
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF" I TAL: I
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-459
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:




ITEM: PARALLEL DATA CONVERTER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN






























PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 3
A[2 ] B[F] C(F]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS ALL COMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.
DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.
LOSS OF AUTO EE CAPABILITIES.
REFERENCES:









ITEM" DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: I TAL: I
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BAKCUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-461
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









DIRECT MEMOR¥ ACCESS CONTROLLER
OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-462
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.5
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 " C-463
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC
OPEN











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /






CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-464
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-465
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT _ / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.6
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMEHTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-467
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 7
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-468
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.$
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 596 ABORT:
ITEM" O/P LATCH (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.8
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE














ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED












rLi HDWlnn c ABO T KDWI SC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBERz MCU.MC.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTE AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE
CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP
REMAIN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-471
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:
MDAC IDz 698 ABORT:
ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: MCIU
PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.9
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCR: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBI T: i/1 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /











LOSS OF CAPTURE AND RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-473
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURE FAILURE


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM









INADVERTANT RELEASE. POSSIBLE ORBITER PL CONTACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-474
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.2
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RIGIDIZE DERIGIDIZE. IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING
RIGIDIZATION. PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-475
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-476
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[Y]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.3
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY CAPTURE AND RELEASE. PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-477
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT















































REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-478
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILED ON











FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.4
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT OR JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE. PL COULD SWING INTO ORBITER.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-479
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILED OFF









FLIGHT PHASE HDWlFUNC ABORT HDWlFUNC
PRELAUNCH: I RTLS: I
LIFTOFF: / TAL: I
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





CAPTURE BRAKE WILL TAKE RIGIDIZE LOAD. IF CAPDTURE BRAKE OR





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-480
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILED ON ENGAGED











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.5
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLUTCH WILL SLIP WHEN MOTOR DRIVES RIGID OR DERIGID. MAY CAUSE
LONGER RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE DRIVE TIME.
REFERENCES:
























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF RIGIDIZE DERIGIDIZE. PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER.
REFERENCES:











FAILURE MODE: FAILED OFF DISENGAGED










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF CAPTURE PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER IF FAILURE OCCURS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-483
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILED ENGAGED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.6
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. CLUTCH WILL SLIP DURING CAPTURE/RELEASE, MAY BE SLUGGISH.
REFERENCES:
I%EPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-484
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILED DISENGAGED











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MCH. 6
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RIGID/DERIGIDIZE. PL COULD SWING INTO ORBITER.
REFERENCES :









ITEM: CAPTURE DRIVE TRAIN
FAILURE MODE: JAMMING




























LOSS OF CAPTURE RELEASE.
REFERENCES •
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-486
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: CAPTURE DRIVE TRAIN
FAILURE MODE: FAILS FREE





































REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFI_OrF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: /





LOSS OF RIGID/DERIGID FUNCTION. PL MAY CONTACT ORBITER, IF
FAILURE OCCURS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-488
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS FREE





























REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-489
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.6
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN HE IS DERIGID. AUTO RELEASE WILL
RELEASE WITHOUT DERIGIZING.
REFERENCES:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL" /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 6
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN HE IS DERIGID. AUTO RELEASE WILL
DERIGIDIZE TO THE EXTEND POSITION AND NOT RELEASE PLAYLOAD.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA_ /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN SNARES ARE CLOSED. LOSS OF AUTO
CAPTUE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-492
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODEz FAILS OFF










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN SNARES ARE CLOSED. LOSS OF AUTO
CAPTUE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-493
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TALz /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING_ /





CAPTURE WILL ALWAYS BE INDICATED. ONCE EE IS RIGIDIZED, LOADED
RATE FLAG WILL BE SET.
REFERENCES:



























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 2
CAUSES- STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAPTURE WILL NEVER BE INDICATED. LOADED RATE FLAG WILL NOT BE
SET. PL MAY BE MOVED AT UNLOADED RATES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-495
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW IF SNARES ARE OPEN. AUTO RELEASE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-496
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





OPERATOR WILL NOT KONW IF SNARES ARE OPEN. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-497
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.I
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF EE IS EXTENDED. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE
BECAUSE EE WILL CONTINUE TO DRIVE DERIGID.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-498
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT





















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF EE IS EXTENDED. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE
BECAUSE EE WILL NOT RESPOND TO AUTO RELEASE COMMAND.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-499
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: EXTEND MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON



























CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS ON OR SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTEND INDICATION FAILS TRUE. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-500
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









EXTEND MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAILS OFF

































CAUSES: OP AMP OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01127/87 C-501
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAIL ON












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [HA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3
CAUSES: OPAMP FAILS SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RIGIDIZE INDICATION FAILED TRUE. AFTER FIRST CAPTURE LOADED RATE
FLAG WILL BE SET.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-502
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAIL OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /





A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: OP AMP OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













DERIGIDIZED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAIL ON












FLIGHT PHASE "HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3
CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS ON OR SHORTED CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DERIGIDIZE INDICATION FAILS FALSE. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-504
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT





FLI GHT: 3/ 3
ABORT: /
ITEM: DERIGIDIZED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF" / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /





A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: OPAMP OR TRANSISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DERIGIDIZE INDICATION FAILS TRUE. AUTO RELEASE WILL RELEASE
WITHOUT DERIGIDIZING.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-505
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









CLOSED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAIL ON

























PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 3
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: OPAMP FAILS SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLOSED INDICATION FAILS TRUE. LOSS OF AUTO CAPTURE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-506
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









CLOSED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAIL OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /





A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: OP AMP OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLOSED INDICATION FAILS FALSE. LOSS OF AUTO CAPTURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-507
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CONDITONER
FAIL ON


























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAPTURE INDICATION FAILS TRUE. LOSS OF AUTO CAPTURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-508
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CONDZTONER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /





A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAPTURE INDICATION FAILS OFF. LOADED RATE FLAG WILL NOT SET WHEN
PL IS CAPTURED. LOADED ARM WILL MOVE AT UNLOADED RATES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON
































CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE;
OPEN INDICATION WILL FAIL 'Z_UE, AUTO RELEASE LOST.
REFERENCES;
REPORT DAT_ 01/27/87 C-510
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FAIL OFF












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3
CAUSES: OPAMP FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN INDICATION WILL FAIL FALSE. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









CAPTURE/RELEASE BRAKE/CLUTCH POWER SWITCH DRIVER
OPEN POWER SWITCH










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONOREIT" 1/1 AOA: /





A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: TRANSISTOR OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SNARE BRAKE WOULD FAIL ON AND RIGIDIZE CLUTCH WOULD FAIL ENGAGED.
CAPTURE AND RELEASE LOST. ARM WOULD BE LIMP WHEN CAPTURE
COMMANDED.
REFERENCES:











RIGID/DERIGID BRAKE/CLUTCH POWER SWITCH DRIVER
OPEN POWER SWITCH












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA" /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B (NA ] C (NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU.I
CAUSES: TRANSISTOR OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SNARE CLUCH WOULD FAIL ENGAGED ANDRIGIDIZE BRAKE WOULD FAIL ON.
RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE FUNCTION WOULD BE LOST, BUT ARM WOULD BE LIMP
WHEN RIGIDIZE COMMANDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-513
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER
FAILS ON











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /




PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 6
A(2] B(F] C[F]
CAUSES: TRANSISTOR FAILS SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOTOR PHASE ON CONTINOUSLY. MOTOR WILL RUN SLUGGISHLY. IF IT
STOPS IN A DEADZONE IT WILL NOT START AGAIN. PL CAN NOT BE
CAPTURED OF RELEASED.
REFERENCES :












ITEM: MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF


























A(2 ] B(F] C[F]
CAUSES: TRANSISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOTOR PHASE ON CONTINOUSLY. MOTOR WILL RUN SLUGGISHLY. IF IT













FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] c [_A ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU.5
CAUSES: INVERTOR OR GATE FAILS ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BITE WILL NOT ANNUNCIATE FAILURES.
REFERENCES:
C-516REPORT DATE 0 I/27/S 7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] CNA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU.5
CAUSES: INVERTOR OR GATE FAILS OFF
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BITE WILL BE ON WHILE ARM IS SELECTED.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01127187 C-517
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT










ITEM: POWER SWITCH DRIVERS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON












"FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





EE MOTOR WILL NOT OPERATE IF IT HAS STOPPED IN THE DEAD ZONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-518
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: POWER SWITCH DRIVERS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /






CAUSES: TRANSISTOR FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EE MOTOR WILL NOT OPERATE IF IT HAS STOPPED IN THE DEAD ZONE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-519
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MULTIPLE ACTIVATE CMD INHIBIT
FAILS OFF


























CAUSES: NAND GATE UI8B FAILS ON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO SAFEGUARD AGAINST TWO COMMANDS AT THE SAME TIME.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-520
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MULTIPLE ACTIVATE CMD INHIBIT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU.7
CAUSES: NAND GATE UI8B FAILS OFF
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CAPTURE OR RELEASE IN PRIMARY MODE. BACKUP RELEASE
AVAILABLE. PL COULD CONTACT ORBITER IF FAILURE OCCURED.
REFERENCES:

























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBITI i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RIGIDIZE WILL NEVER BE INDICATED OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW IF HE IS
RIGIDIZED. AUTO CAPTURE IS LOST BECAUSE RIGIDIZE COMMAND WILL NOT
SHUT OFF UNTIL THE EE MODE SWITCH IS TURNED OFF.
REFERENCES :










FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF












PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
•ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: _ [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.3
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE DEBIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RIGIDIZE WILLALWAYS BE INDICATED. AFTER FIRST CAPTURE LOADED
RATE FLAG WILL BE SET.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-523
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM







CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT FOR BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-524
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) END EFFECTOR



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F]
LOCATION: ARM









CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) END EFFECTOR















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F]
LOCATION: ARM






C [ F ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE HIGH LOW TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-526
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) END EFFECTOR








































LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) END EFFECTOR

























CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-528
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) END EFFECTOR














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] • B [ F ]
LOCATION: ARM





















FAILURE MODE: FAILURE TO OPEN

































CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-530
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) END EFFECTOR





























PART NUMBER: EE.BRS. 1
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-531
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) END EFFECTOR



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.BRS. 1
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-532
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT



































PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 6
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ALL EE FUNCTIONS. BACKUP RELEASE WORKS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-533
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ]
LOCATION: ARM









LOSE ALL EE FUNCTIONS. BACKUP RELEASE WORKS.
REFERENCES:










FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MTR.8
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE COMTAMINATION HIGH LOW TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSE ALL EE FUNCTIONS. BACKUP RELEASE WORKS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-535
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM









LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-536
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT



































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM









LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-537
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM









LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-538
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT





























LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
Q
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-539
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 3
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:










FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT



























LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








































LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-542
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA- /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS- A [NA ] B [NA ] C IRA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.MTR.5
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE CONTAMINATION HIGH LOW TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 872 ABORT: /
ITEM: CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /





A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-544
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL
OPEN











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACEUPRELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-545
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 874 ABORT: /
ITEM: RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-546
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL
OPEN












FLIGHT PHAS_ . HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /




PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 4
A (NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-547
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 876 ABORT: /
ITEM: CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU. i0
B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-548 °
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 877 ABORT: /
ITEM: CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU. i0
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-549
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 878 ABORT: /
ITEM: RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-550
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE
OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU. ii
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED










FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTI,_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBI T: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-552
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL
OPEN











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-554
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM" CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-556
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR
OPEN











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-557
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT









RIG/DERIG/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR
SHORTED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT. / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 15
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-558
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 887 ABORT: /
ITEM: RIG/DERIG/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RBLEASEREMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-559
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 888 ABORT: /
ITEM: FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL DETECTOR
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED











"FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-560
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1
MDAC ID: 889 ABORT: /
ITEM: FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL DETECTOR
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-561
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 17
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-562
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-563
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT







ITEM: CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.
REFERENCES:










FAILURE MODE: RUPTURED, FRACTURED























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] c[ ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ARM.BM. 1
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ARM WILLHAVE INCORRECT PATH.
REFERENCES:








































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / • RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ARM.TH. 2
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



















FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ARM.TH. 3
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALSE READING MAY CAUSE TEMPERATURE TO GO HIGHER THAN LIMITS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-568
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL SEPARATION OR DEGRADED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUSDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ARM.TH. 4
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEAT TRANSFER, MAY EFFECT TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-569
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION: ARM









LOSS OF RELEASE INDICATION
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-570
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] . B [ ] cc ]
LOCATION: ARM





REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-571
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT





REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ]
LOCATION: ARM





















FAILURE MODE: RUPTURED, FRACTURED, BREAKAGE






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: ARM
PART NUMBER: ARM.SB. 3
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN LIFE OF ARM/ARM JOINT.
REFERENCES:









































FAILURE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-574
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: RUPTURED, FRACTURED, BINDING



































FAILURE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE
REFERENCES:























































ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR

























































































































































































D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT
LINES
D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT
LINES
D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT
LINES
D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT
LINES
D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT
LINES
D & C INVERTOR NETWORK





































































































D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR
CLOCK PULSE
STROBE PULSE
SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER
SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER
PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER
PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER












OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT OPEN
OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT SHORTED
OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT SHORTED
OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT OPEN













































OPEN, DIRECT DRIVE CIRCUIT
OPEN, CAPTURE CIRCUIT
OPEN






















































































































MOTOR FAILS DUE TO SEIZED
BEARINGS
MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN
MOTOR SHAFT OR QUILL
COUPLER
MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN
DRIVE SHAFT OR PINION GEAR
ERRATIC OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT. ALL THREE
CHANNELS FAIL OFF
LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL
NO OUTPUT
LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL
LOSS OF 2 OR MORE CHANNELS
NO OUTPUT


















POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING ERRATIC OUTPUT
































































I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL
I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL
0/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL




















DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC
DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC
MDA BITE LOGIC
MDA BITE LOGIC
MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR
























































































































16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR
(3)
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR
(3)
BINARY COUNTERS (2 )
BINARY COUNTERS (2 )
SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP
SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP
VOLTAGE COMPARATOR
VOLTAGE COMPARATOR
ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)




























30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR SHORTED





OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE
WIDTH ADJUSTER








16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR
16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR
O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT
REGISTER (3)
O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT
REGISTER (3)
I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT
REGISTER



































































BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR









4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)
4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)
FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR
TIMING CIRCUIT




READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE
COMPARATOR
READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE OPEN
COMPARATOR
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER,
ABE O/P
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, OPEN
ABE O/P
UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER,
ABE I/P




D & C STROBE
D & C STROBE
D & C CLOCK
D & C CLOCK
ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS
ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS
SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS
(2) ABE I/P
SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS OPEN
(2) ABE I/P
SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS
(2) D & C I/P
SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS OPEN






























































































DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER
DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER
POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC
































































PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CONDITONER FAIL OFF





MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER
MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER
POWER SWITCH DRIVERS
POWER SWITCH DRIVERS













































































CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE
CONTROL
CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE OPEN
CONTROL
RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH
ACTIVATE CONTROL
RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH OPEN
ACTIVATE CONTROL
CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL
SAFE ENABLE
CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL OPEN
SAFE ENABLE
RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL
SAFE ENABLE
RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL OPEN
SAFE ENABLE
MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL
MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL
MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL
MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL
CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL
DETECTOR




RIG/DERIG/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL OPEN
DETECTOR
FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL
DETECTOR
FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL OPEN
DETECTOR
EE POWER CONDITIONER
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